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Abstract: Building on attempts during the 1980s to establish principles of Open Network 
Architecture (ONA), unbundling obligations became a cornerstone of the framework for 
local competition devised by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Several of the 
regulations developed by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), including the 
impairment test to assess whether a network element had to be unbundled, the TELRIC 
pricing method, the obligation to re-bundle network elements to service platforms and the 
unbundling provisions for broadband networks were challenged repeatedly in court. In 
response to multiple defeats of earlier rules, the FCC had to refine its approach and define 
unbundling obligations more narrowly. Effective as of March 11th, 2005, unbundling 
obligations will essentially be limited to the local copper loop, dedicated interoffice 
transportation on routes connecting small markets, and high-capacity loops in small 
markets. Carriers presently using unbundled network elements that do not qualify under 
the new rules will have to transition to alternative solutions within 12-18 months. During 
this period, the FCC has set higher ceiling prices for these unbundled network elements. 
The Commission affirmed the elimination in 2003 of its unbundling obligations in 
broadband markets. 
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nbundling is one of the most contested and in some respects poorly 
understood areas of communications policy. In particular, the 
dynamic effects of unbundling obligations on investment and 
innovation decisions of incumbents and new entrants are subject to 
considerable dispute. Predecessors to unbundling were introduced in the 
U.S. during the late 1980s, when Open Network Architecture (ONA) was 
developed as a blueprint governing access to essential network functions.  
Far-reaching unbundling requirements for incumbent local exchange carriers 
were mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 1. The specific 
regulations crafted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and 
                     
(*)Available as Quello Center Working Paper, http://quello.msu.edu/wp/wp-05-02.pdf. 
1 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56. The 1996 Act amended 
the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.  Sections cited in this article refer to 
the amended legal text, which will be referred to as the “Act”. 
U
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the 50 state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) to implement the Act were 
more stringent and detailed than unbundling provisions in most other 
countries. They have been challenged by major stakeholders in court since, 
leaving the U.S. unbundling regime in a state of flux for more than eight 
years. In December 2004, responding to court directions, the FCC adopted 
an Order that substantially redefined the unbundling obligations of 
incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs) in the narrowband markets. The 
full text of the Order was released on February 4, 2005 and will become 
effective as of March 11th, 2005 (FCC 2005) 2. It marks the current end 
point of the prolonged, eight-year legal struggle to translate the unbundling 
provisions of the Act, especially its "impairment" standard, into sustainable 
regulatory rules. Together with modifications that had been adopted in 
earlier Orders and survived court review, the latest Order constitutes the 
prevailing unbundling framework.   
Compared to the initial rules adopted by the FCC in August 1996 and 
expanded in subsequent amendments, the unbundling obligations of ILECs 
have been drastically curtailed and the ILECs have gained considerable 
freedom to price network elements: although it will be possible for 
competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) to buy unbundled network 
elements other than those that continue to be regulated, they are likely to 
have to do so at much higher market-based prices. Despite these major 
changes, the present rules cannot be regarded as a new "unbundling 
philosophy". Rather, they result from the confluence of several forces, 
including the need to find a pragmatic response to repeated defeats of 
earlier rules in the courts; a critical assessment of experiences with previous 
unbundling rules, a response to the changing technological basis of the 
industry and a new vision regarding the role of digital applications such as 
VoIP. The new rules also seem to reflect a shift in the political power 
balance in favor of incumbent carriers. At the heart of the FCC's approach 
continues to be trust in facilities-based competition with light-handed 
regulation only applied to cases where competitors would be impaired 
without access to unbundled network elements. With regard to narrowband, 
the new rules align the U.S. framework closer with unbundling policies in 
other countries.  With regard to broadband, the new rules create a less 
regulated, more market-based environment.  
                     
2 Regulatory and court decisions are referred to by issuing institution and year.  Detailed case 
numbers are provided in the reference section at the end of the article. 
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This article reviews the main stages of the evolution of the unbundling 
rules in the narrowband and broadband markets and their rationales. It 
proceeds with a critical assessment of the foundations of the policy changes 
and their likely impact on the future development of competition. To keep the 
topic manageable, the emphasis is placed on the federal rules, which have 
determined the overall course and substance of unbundling, with only 
occasional reference to developments at the state level. 
? The long and winding search for a sustainable approach 
The rationale and substance of the most recent Order can only be 
understood in the context from which it emerged. Space constraints do not 
permit a detailed discussion here, but this section offers a synopsis of the 
major milestones in this process 3. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 
codified many regulatory practices that had been adopted before its 
passage. The predecessors to the Act's unbundling provisions were the 
rules governing access to network facilities and services for enhanced 
service providers. These had evolved from earlier policies dating back to the 
Computer Inquiries, a series of proceedings that began in 1966 to delineate 
the rights and obligations of basic and enhanced service providers. From 
these deliberations, in the late 1980s the concept of Open Network 
Architecture (ONA) emerged, specifying rules whereby enhanced service 
providers could access essential network functions provided by carriers that 
also had a presence in enhanced service markets (NOAM, 2001, chapter 6). 
Whereas ONA was never fully implemented, unbundling became a 
cornerstone of the Act's objective to expand the reach of competition to local 
voice markets. 
?  Telecommunications Act and Local Competition Order 
The drafters of the Act envisioned that three forms of competition would 
emerge in local markets: facilities-based competition, service-based 
competition (resale) and competition via unbundled network elements 
                     
3 More detailed legal histories of the unbundling rules can be found in the relevant FCC Orders, 
most recently FCC (2003, 2005). See also the excellent discussion in NUECHTERLEIN & 
WEISER (2005, especially chapters 3 and 5). 
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(UNEs), a hybrid form in which carriers could combine network components 
purchased from incumbent service providers with their own facilities. Resale, 
and to some degree UNEs, were seen as transitory stages on the road to 
facilities-based competition. For resellers, ILECs were required to make their 
retail services available at wholesale at retail price minus avoided costs 
(such as marketing, invoicing and billing costs). With regard to unbundling, 
section 251(c)(3) of the Act proscribed that ILECs must provide requesting 
telecommunications carriers "nondiscriminatory access to network elements 
on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and 
conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory in accordance 
with [...] the requirements of this section and section 252". It further stated 
that incumbent local exchange carriers had to provide: "unbundled network 
elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such 
elements in order to provide such telecommunications service". This 
obligation to bundle UNEs for new entrants became one of the most hotly 
contested areas of the rules. 
The FCC was instructed to use an "impairment" standard in determining 
which network elements had to be unbundled (section 251(d)(2)). More 
specifically, the Act stated that: 
"in determining what network elements should be made available for 
purposes of subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission shall 
consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such network elements 
as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide 
access to such network elements would impair the ability of the 
telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that 
it seeks to offer" (emphasis added).  
It is the standard used to establish "impairment" that was at the heart of 
court challenges and eventually led to an elimination of many of the earlier 
unbundling rules. Section 252(d)(1) further required that such network 
elements must be made available at cost-based rates, "… however 
determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other rate-based 
proceeding". This last provision is often interpreted as requiring the use of 
price caps to set rates for unbundled network elements. 
Implementing these provisions, the FCC, in its Local Competition Order 
in August 1996 (FCC 1996), specified seven unbundled network elements: 
(1) local loops, (2) network interface devices, (3) local and tandem switching, 
(4) interoffice transmission facilities, (5) signaling networks and call related 
databases, (6) operations support systems, and (7) operator services and 
directory assistance (FCC 1996). To price these unbundled network 
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elements and combinations, the FCC developed the TELRIC (Total Element 
Long Run Incremental Cost) standard, a forward-looking methodology to 
generate a benchmark based on the assumption that an efficient, modern 
network (rather than the legacy network) is in place.  Even though the state 
PUCs challenged the FCC's costing guidelines and price benchmarks, most 
of them followed some form of long run incremental cost (LRIC) standard 
and, in fact, set prices that were in the range originally proposed by the FCC. 
From this Order, two principal unbundling models emerged, with 
differentiated rules for the mass market (residential users and small 
businesses) and the enterprise market. New entrants could lease unbundled 
network element loops in conjunction with their own switching and 
transportation facilities. Most importantly, they could lease local loops, a 
model given the acronym "UNE-L". They could also lease re-bundled UNEs 
from the ILECs. In the mass market, an unbundled network platform, 
consisting of local loop, switching and transportation ("UNE-P") emerged as 
an attractive model for new entrants. This allowed CLECs to enter the 
market without any complementary facilities investment. In the enterprise 
market, CLECs were able to request enhanced extended loops (EELs), 
combining a local loop, interoffice transportation, and cross-connect or 
multiplexing, if necessary. EEL enables CLECs to serve business customers 
without having to collocate in every local exchange by routing traffic to those 
central offices which contained their own switching equipment. Incumbent 
LECs claimed that UNE-P was a resale service in disguise at a price much 
lower than would have resulted from applying the retail price minus avoided 
cost formula. Conversely, new competitors and state PUCs argued that 
UNE-P was an important step in opening the local market up to competitors. 
?  Early court challenges to USTA I 
Several of the provisions of the Local Competition Order were challenged 
on procedural and substantive grounds by industry and state regulators.  
Inter alia, the FCC's authority to promulgate nation-wide rules, its standard 
to assess impairment and its guidelines for unbundled network element 
pricing were contested. The different cases were consolidated in the Eight 
District Court as Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, which affirmed some of the 
rules and overturned others (Eight District Court, 1997). The FCC, MCI, AT&T 
and other incumbent LECs appealed different aspects of the decision to the 
U.S. Supreme Court. In AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Board the Court found that the 
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FCC had disregarded the Act's mandate by assuming that "any increase in 
cost (or decrease in quality) imposed by denial of a network element" would 
constitute impairment of the entrant (U.S. Supreme Court 1999, 389-390).  
However, while the court directed the FCC to reconsider the impairment 
standard, it did not limit the Commission's ability to require any element to be 
unbundled at cost-based rates. Furthermore, the FCC's authority to 
promulgate rules implementing section 251 of the Act and the TELRIC 
standard were upheld 4.  
To remedy the weaknesses found by the U.S. Supreme Court, the FCC 
issued its UNE Remand Order in November 1999 in which the list of UNEs 
was narrowed by eliminating operator service and directory assistance from 
the list of network elements (FCC, 1999b). However, in a separate Order, the 
list was expanded by adding dark fiber, subloops, and the high frequency 
portion of the copper loop used to provide DSL as unbundled network 
elements (FCC, 1999a). In response to the FCC's limited effort to improve the 
impairment standard, the UNE Remand Order was again challenged by the 
incumbents in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted petitions for 
review. Early in 2001 ─ the FCC now composed of three Republican and 
two Democratic Commissioners ─ Republican Michael K. Powell, who was 
strongly in favor of light regulation, was appointed Chairman of the agency. 
While the appeals court case was pending, the FCC released its Triennial 
Review Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) (FCC, 2003), in which it 
sought comment on whether the unbundling regime should be further 
modified to reflect changing technological and market conditions. 
During the NPRM comment phase, the D.C. Court issued its decision in 
United States Telecom Association v. FCC (USTA I), in which it vacated and 
remanded the FCC's interpretation of the impairment standard and the list of 
UNEs based on it (D.C. Circuit Court, 2002). The court reasoned that the 
FCC's impairment analysis did not take into account differences in particular 
markets and customer classes and was hence not "sufficiently granular". It 
also found that the Commission's analysis had failed to adequately weigh 
the costs of unbundling, such as disincentives to invest for incumbent 
service providers, and that it had not distinguished between impairment 
cause by the natural monopoly characteristics of the market and cost 
disadvantages faces by all new entrants. Furthermore, it vacated and 
                     
4 The TELRIC standard was again challenged by the incumbent LECs as leading to rates so 
low that they were confiscatory.  The D.C. Court of Appeals agreed with this claim but in 
Verizon v. FCC, the U.S. Supreme Court once again upheld TELRIC as one possible cost 
standard that the FCC could use (U.S. SUPREME COURT 2002). 
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remanded the FCC's line sharing requirements, arguing that the Commission 
had failed to consider competition from cable modem service, which actually 
was the market leader. In response, the FCC asked commenters in the 
Triennial Review NPRM also to respond to the issues raised by the court 
decision.   
?  The Triennial Review Order and USTA II 
The Triennial Review Order, adopted in February 2003 and released in 
August 2003, proposed a new impairment standard and narrowed the 
unbundling obligations in several areas. According to the refined standard, 
impairment existed "when lack of access to an incumbent LEC network 
poses a barrier or barriers to entry […] that are likely to make entry 
uneconomic" (FCC, 2003, pp. 58-64). Relevant structural barriers to be 
considered in the impairment analysis were "(1) economies of scale; (2) 
sunk costs; (3) first-mover advantages; (4) absolute cost advantages; and 
(5) barriers within the control of the incumbent" (FCC, 2005, p. 8). In a political 
compromise, the two Democratic Commissioners and Republican 
Commissioner Martin agreed to keep the narrowband unbundling framework 
(UNE-L, UNE-P) in place, but to free ILECs from unbundling rules in the 
broadband markets 5. For switching, high-capacity loops and dedicated 
transport, the Commission asked the states to conduct the impairment 
analysis on a granular basis. Against the votes of Chairman Powell and 
Commissioner Abernathy, who had considered keeping line sharing in place 
for copper lines to provide an additional incentive for ILECs to invest in fiber-
based networks, but was opposed to UNE-P, the Order required that line 
sharing be phased out over a three-year period. Furthermore, new 
("greenfield") fiber deployment was fully exempted from the unbundling 
rules. For overlays to existing copper networks and hybrid copper-fiber 
networks ("brownfield" projects), the Order established that only a 
narrowband channel needed to be unbundled.  The Order delegated the task 
of promulgating the more granular rules required by the court decision to the 
state public utility commissions and set a strict time-table to that end.  
Various parties, including the United States Telecom Association (USTA) 
representing the ILECs, appealed several parts of the Order, including the 
                     
5 In separate statements, the democratic Commissioners Copps and Adelstein expressed their 
unease over dropping the line sharing rules to achieve compromise on the narrowband 
provisions of the order.   
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finding that the narrowband mass market switching and the enterprise 
markets were impaired and that the states should promulgate the more 
granular rules required by earlier court directions. 
In March 2004, the D.C. District Court of Appeals decided United States 
Telecom Association v. FCC (USTA II), in which several rules were 
expressly upheld, one was vacated and others were vacated and remanded 
to the agency (D.C. Circuit Court, 2004). Among the Commission's findings in 
the Triennial Review Order that were expressly upheld are the three-year 
phase-out of line sharing, the decision not to require unbundling of FTTH, 
provisions governing hybrid copper-fiber loops, the elimination of enterprise 
switching, and the pricing and combination requirement. However, the court 
vacated the agency's sub-delegation of authority to the states to develop 
granular unbundling rules. Moreover, it vacated and remanded the FCC's 
finding of nationwide impairment with respect to mass market switching (and 
thus indirectly of UNE-P) and dedicated transport.  In the switching market, 
the FCC had only relied on one particular method (the "hot cut" process) for 
transferring lines from an incumbent's to a competitor's switch and did not 
consider alternative procedures when assessing impairment. Finally, the 
court called into question certain aspects of the overall unbundling 
framework, including the efficiency level of competitors used when 
determining impairment, the FCC's lack of reliance on information from 
comparable markets, and the failure to consider alternatives to unbundling.   
With Commissioner Martin changing his stance, neither the FCC nor the 
government appealed the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court.  A petition by 
several parties, including state regulators and CLECs, to the Supreme Court 
was not granted certiorari (i.e., was not accepted for review).  In August 
2004, the FCC issued an interim Order to avoid disruption of the 
telecommunications markets and to gain time to develop a more detailed 
policy (FCC, 2004a). The December 2004 Order ("Triennial Remand Order"), 
published February 4, 2005, is the response to USTA II and addresses the 
concerns raised in that decision (FCC, 2005). 
?  Present unbundling rules 
The Triennial Remand Order together with provisions that survived the 
multiple court reviews unscathed, form the present unbundling framework.  
The latest Order refines the overall unbundling framework. It affected the 
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rules governing unbundling in the narrowband mass market and enterprise 
market. Rules regarding fiber developments and overbuilds, as well as rules 
related to line sharing, remained in place from earlier Orders. 
?  Unbundling framework 
The latest Order refines the framework developed in the Triennial Review 
Order with regard to impairment. The appeals court had criticized that the 
FCC did not specify the level of efficiency of competitors for whom lack of 
access to a network element poses a barrier or barriers to entry. In 
response, the FCC clarified that impairment needs to be determined with 
reference to a hypothetical "reasonably efficient" competitor (FCC, 2005, pp. 
15-17). Thus, an entrant could not claim impairment if its business model was 
only workable contingent upon unbundled network elements. The 
Commission clarified that impairment can persist with regard to any 
telecommunications services (and not just in cases of core services offered 
in direct competition with the incumbent, as had previously been the case).  
Following the direction of the court in USTA II, the Commission decided, 
however, to prohibit the use of unbundling for exclusive service to 
competitive markets, specifically mobile wireless services and long distance 
services (FCC, 2005, pp. 17-25). In these market segments, it was reasoned 
that competitors were able to develop working business models without 
access to unbundled network elements and thus cannot be considered 
impaired. In its Order, the agency states that Congress did not introduce the 
unbundling framework to increase profits in competitive market segments. 
Given the direction of the USTA II court, the FCC had to come up with its 
own finding of market segments in which impairment existed. In order to 
facilitate such determination, the Order abandons national unbundling rules 
in favor of a more differentiated approach.  
As will be discussed in more detail in the following subsections, "similar" 
markets are distinguished based on the expected revenue opportunities 
and/or the likely presence of competitive fiber facilities. The likelihood that 
"reasonably efficient" competitors will be impaired in these segments is then 
evaluated. Lastly, the FCC now takes alternative offerings, such as tariffed 
special access arrangements, into account when assessing impairment. 
However, the Commission refused to accept special access as a general 
indicator that new entrants were not impaired. Such a generic rule, as was 
proposed by major ILECs, would raise several concerns, among them the 
68     
ability of the ILECs to manipulate competition via these special access 
tariffs. Thus, availability of tariffed services was not considered a sufficient 
condition for non-impairment. 
?  Mass market unbundling 
In the mass market, comprising of residential and small business 
customers, after a transition period, only local loops will be available on an 
unbundled basis (UNE-L). Using the directions provided by the USTA II 
court, the FCC eliminated its earlier finding of impairment in the (residential 
and small business) mass market for local circuit switching. As a 
consequence, the widely used UNE-P platform will no longer be available 
after the 12 month transition period.  Thus, in the future, carriers will either 
have to deploy some of their own facilities, lease network elements such as 
switching from other CLECs, or lease them from ILECs, but at non-regulated 
market prices. In justifying this new finding, the FCC points to recent 
developments in the mass market.  First, it is argued that CLECs have 
deployed soft switches and packet switches in a growing number of 
exchanges.  Between 1999 and 2003, 500 new switches were installed, 
bringing the total to 1,200 serving more than 3 million competitive access 
lines (FCC, 2005, pp. 112-115). The Bell operating Companies (BOCs) 
submitted evidence showing that competitive switches had been deployed in 
137 of the top 150 Metropolitan Statistical Areas. Many of these new 
switches could be shared with other CLECs, thus reducing their dependence 
on ILEC switching services. Even though competitive switches are not 
deployed ubiquitously, they can reach a wide territory as dedicated transport 
arrangements facilitate the aggregation of traffic for switching in distant wire 
centers. Weighing all evidence, the FCC argues that the incremental costs of 
competitive switching do not impair reasonable efficient competitors.  
According to the Commission, this is demonstrated by the fact that several 
CLECs, including McLeodUSA, FDN Communications and Cavalier 
Telephone, use competitive switching in combination with UNE-L. Secondly, 
the FCC, analyzing alternatives to the "hot cut" process used to transfer 
lines from an ILEC's switch to that of a CLEC, found that other methods, 
such as batch cuts, are now available, meaning that CLECs are no longer 
impaired 6. 
                     
6 The CLECs had argued that hot cuts cost up to USD 50 upfront that could not be recovered 
due to high churn rates and low margins. 
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As of March 11th, 2005, ILECs are therefore under no obligation to offer 
unbundled mass market local circuit switching (and thus UNE-P). For 
existing unbundled switching customers, the FCC adopted a 12-month 
transition plan.  During this period, competitive carriers will not be allowed to 
add new switching UNEs. Furthermore, UNE-P prices will increase. The 
FCC declares that, "during the transition period, competitive carriers will 
retain access to the UNE platform (i.e., the combination of an unbundled 
loop, unbundled local circuit switching and shared transport) at a rate equal 
to the higher of (1) the rate at which the requesting carrier leased that 
combination of elements on June 15th, 2004, plus one dollar, or (2) the rate 
the state public utility commission establishes, if any, between June 16th, 
2004, and the effective date of this Order, for this combination of elements, 
plus one dollar" (FCC, 2005).  The Commission has not released details to 
substantiate the magnitude of the price increases other than that it will ease 
the transition by avoiding a rate shock, while protecting the interests of the 
ILECs where unbundling will be eliminated. 
?  Dedicated interoffice transport market unbundling 
Unbundled dedicated interoffice transportation is used by carriers to 
aggregate end-user traffic both in the mass market and the enterprise 
market. The FCC differentiates DS1 (24 voice grade circuits), DS3 (28 DS1 
lines) and dark fiber transport. To make the required granular assessment of 
impairment in these markets, the FCC first defined three tiers of markets.  In 
defining markets, the FCC attempted to reflect the state of state of 
competition and the revenue potential of a service and used proxies to 
capture these features: the number of fiber-based collocators and the 
number of business lines served in a market. Tier 1 wire centers are 
characterized by the presence of four or more fiber-based collocators or over 
38,000 business lines. About two thirds of the wire centers in this tier have 
more than 4 fiber-based collocators, signifying the existence of substantial 
revenue opportunities. According to the Commission's analysis, in this 
situation it is likely that a CLEC may either be able to deploy facilities itself or 
acquire services in the wholesale market 7. Approximately 5.4 percent of all 
                     
7 Stakeholders proposed widely different thresholds for business line counts: the RBOCs Bell 
South, Verizon and SBC proposed 5,000 lines and several CLECs more than the 38,000 
proposed by the FCC (FCC, 2005, p. 68). 
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10,796 BOC wire centers fall into this category. Tier 2 wire centers have 
three or more fiber-based collocators or over 24,000 business lines.  About 
two thirds of these wire centers have three or more fiber-based collocators.  
Approximately 3.2 percent of all BOC wire centers, serving 12.6 percent of 
all BOC business lines, fall into the Tier 2 category (FCC, 2005, p. 69). Tier 3 
wire centers are all remaining centers. 
Using these thresholds, the FCC found that requesting carriers are 
impaired without access to DS1 capacity "on all routes except those 
connecting two Tier 1 wire centers" (FCC, 2005, p. 72). In other words, on 
routes involving Tier 2 or Tier 3 wire centers, DS1 transport circuits have the 
be made available by ILECs on an unbundled basis. To maintain 
consistency with its DS3 unbundling rules, the FCC limits the number of 
unbundled DS1 transport circuits that one carrier may request to 10 (FCC, 
2005, p. 73). DS3 loops have to be unbundled for all routes involving at least 
one Tier 3 wire center; no carrier may request more than 12 DS3 transport 
circuits (FCC, 2005, pp. 74-75). Likewise, dark fiber only needs to be offered 
on an unbundled basis on routes involving at least one Tier 3 wire center 
(FCC, 2005, pp. 75-77). Lastly, based on market evidence, the FCC 
determined that lack of access to entrance facilities (the facilities connecting 
a CLEC network to an ILEC network) does not constitute impairment (FCC, 
2005, pp. 77-80). As in the case of mass market circuit switching, a 12-month 
transition plan was adopted for competing carriers to transition away from 
the use of DS1- and DS3-capacity dedicated transport where they are not 
impaired. For dark fiber, an 18-month plan was put into place. According to 
the FCC: 
 "these transition plans apply only to the embedded customer base, 
and do not permit competitive LECs to add new dedicated transport 
UNEs in the absence of impairment. During the transition periods, 
competitive carriers will retain access to unbundled dedicated transport 
at a rate equal to the higher of (1) 115% of the rate the requesting 
carrier paid for the transport element on June 15th, 2004, or (2) 115% 
of the rate the state commission has established or establishes, if any, 
between June 16th, 2004 and the effective date of this Order" (FCC, 
2005, pp. 4-5).  
The FCC has not released details to substantiate the magnitude of the 
price increases other than that it will ease the transition by avoiding a rate 
shock while protecting the interests of the ILECs where unbundling will be 
eliminated 
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?  High-capacity loops 
High capacity loops are primarily used to serve business customers. 
Based on the directions provided by the USTA II court, the FCC examined 
whether such loops could be procured from third parties or self-provided.  
Based on the Commission's analysis, DS3 loops need to be unbundled to 
locations within a wire center serving fewer than 38,000 business lines or in 
which fewer than four fiber-based collocators are present (FCC 2005, p 98-
100).  For DS1 loops, the FCC recognized that stand-along provision is 
economically rarely viable.  Thus, it assumed that DS1 loops were only 
available on a competitive basis where sufficient DS3 capacity was present 
that could be leased at the DS1 level.  For that reason, DS1 loops will need 
to be unbundled in wire centers containing fewer than 60,000 business lines 
or fewer than four fiber-based collocators.  Thus, in both cases, unlike in the 
case of dedicated transport, the failure to meet one of the two indicators 
triggers an obligation to unbundle.  The agency found that CLECs are not 
impaired without access to fiber loops in any instance. 
As in the case of dedicated transportation, the FCC adopted "a 12-month 
plan for competing carriers to transition away from use of DS1- and DS3-
capacity loops where they are not impaired, and an 18-month plan to govern 
transitions away from dark fiber loops" (FCC, 2005, pp. 108-109).  Transition 
measures only apply to the embedded customer base "and do not permit 
competitive LECs to add new high-capacity loop UNEs in the absence of 
impairment.  During the transition periods, competitive carriers will retain 
access to unbundled facilities at a rate equal to the higher of (1) 115% of the 
rate the requesting carrier paid for the transport element on June 15th, 2004, 
or (2) 115% of the rate the state commission has established or establishes, 
if any, between June 16th, 2004 and the effective date of this Order" (FCC 
2005, p. 108-109).  The FCC has not released details to substantiate the 
magnitude of the price increases other than that it will ease the transition by 
avoiding a rate shock, while protecting the interests of the ILECs where 
unbundling will be eliminated 
?  Broadband markets 
Unbundling provisions in broadband markets were not directly affected by 
the latest Order, but had already been vacated by the USTA I decision 
and/or phased out in the Triennial Review Order in 2003. As discussed 
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earlier, line sharing had been introduced as a separate network element in 
1999. In USTA I the D.C. Court of Appeals vacated the line sharing rules 
with the argument that the FCC had not considered the market leadership of 
cable and the potential disincentives for ILECs and CLECs to innovate. In 
response, the Triennial Review Order had established a three-year time 
table to phase out line sharing. Thus, until the transition is completed in 
2006, ILECs have to allow line sharing, albeit at higher prices than in the 
past. According to the Order, prices are to increase to 25% of the full copper 
loop price in year 1, 50% in year 2, and 75% in year 3. Under the transition 
plan, new customers could only be added during year 1. ILECs are presently 
in year 2 of the transition. Furthermore, ILECs will have to allow line splitting, 
in which a CLEC acquires a local loop, but only uses the high-frequency 
circuit and makes the voice channel available to another CLEC.   
The Triennial Review Order also had eliminated unbundling requirements 
for fiber deployment to the premises (FTTP) in new developments 
("greenfield" projects) to stimulate investment in these next generation 
platforms. Responding to a request for reconsideration by Bell South and 
other ILECs, in October 2004 the Commission clarified that this exemption 
would also apply to fiber-to-the-curb (FTTC) projects, in which fiber extends 
to within 500 feet of all the customers served by that loop (FCC, 2004b).  If an 
ILEC overbuilds copper loops, it will either have to keep the copper loop in 
service or make a narrowband channel available on an unbundled basis if 
the copper loop is retired. More specifically, ILECs must provide access to a 
voice grade channel via TDM technology or, if no TDM is available, make a 
64kbps channel available. In the Triennial Order, the FCC had also 
eliminated the broadband sharing requirement for hybrid loops. In hybrid 
networks fiber is deployed to points that do not qualify as FTTP or FTTC. In 
such cases, CLECs may deploy their own networks to the fiber termination 
point of the ILEC ("remote terminal") and then lease the remaining copper 
loop (called "subloop"). Overall, interpreting the instruction in the 
Telecommunications Act to facilitate the deployment of advanced 
communications infrastructure and services, unbundling obligations in the 
broadband markets have been essentially eliminated.   
?  Factors contributing to the new unbundling rules 
The new unbundling regime has to be seen in the light of the legal battles 
driving its repeated overhaul for the past eight years. At the same time, it is a 
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response to the experience with earlier approaches to unbundling and a new 
assessment of the future of competition in the narrowband and broadband 
markets. Despite the changing rules, the FCC's mandate remains to 
ascertain the public interest. Thus, each set of rules can be seen as a 
specific expression of the agency's view as to which framework best serves 
the public interest. This is not always a decision based purely on factual 
evidence, but also on political considerations as to which course is the most 
opportune. In the context of the recent Order, the question arises why the 
Commission was willing to accept higher prices for unbundled network 
elements (at least in the short term) and more narrowly targeted unbundling 
obligations. Against this outcome, it is also interesting to ask how, in the 
Commission's view the Order's provisions serve the public interest, the 
ultimate test against which each decision will be judged. Several factors 
have contributed to the new unbundling rules. 
?  Surviving future court review 
First, reacting to several court defeats, the FCC had to define 
"impairment" in ways that would survive possible future legal challenges.  
The conceptual literature on interconnection and access is well developed 
under static conditions (see, for example, LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000 and 
ARMSTRONG, 2002). Early unbundling policies at the federal and state levels 
were clearly inspired by a static view of unbundling and competition. For 
example, the TELRIC standard aimed at mimicking the competitive long run 
equilibrium price of an efficient supplier. As has already been pointed out by 
Joseph Schumpeter in the 1950s, the conditions for static efficiency need to 
be violated to achieve dynamic efficiency.  More recent contributions to the 
research literature take into account the dynamic effects of unbundling rules 
(see, for example, CAVE & VOGELSANG, 2003; MANDY & SHARKEY, 2003; 
VALLETTI, 2003; PINDYCK, 2004; and BOURREAU & DOGAN, 2005). The new 
definition of "impairment" is influenced by a pragmatic dynamic notion of 
competition in which new entrants with access to new technology compete 
against an incumbent with a legacy network. Coaxed by several court 
defeats, the FCC has gradually expanded the weight attributed to the 
dynamic incentives for ILEC and CLEC investment created by its unbundling 
rules. This view is particularly important in the broadband markets, where 
substantial new investment is required. 
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At a practical level, earlier FCC regulations tested whether a competitor's 
lack of access to an unbundled network element would increase the cost of 
the entrant. The U.S. Supreme Court argued convincingly that this was 
inappropriate as entrants in any industry initially face higher costs than the 
incumbents. Thus, impairment had to be defined more narrowly with regard 
to wasteful duplication of investment and natural monopoly features.  
Consequently, the FCC proposed to include factors such as sunk costs, 
economies of scale, first-mover advantages, or other barriers within the 
control of an ILEC in assessing impairment (FCC, 2003). The most recent 
standard evaluates impairment with regard to the capabilities of a 
"reasonably efficient" competitor. The new standard emphasizes that 
impairment is not established solely by the existence of sunk costs or of cost 
increases for competing service providers. Rather, impairment exists if a 
reasonably efficient competitor would not be able to exert an effective check 
on the incumbent's market power. Following the instructions of the appeals 
court, the FCC now explicitly considers the existence of substitutes to 
unbundled network elements, which includes tariffed ― but not price-
regulated ― forms of access, such as special access. Furthermore, the FCC 
weighs the potential costs of unbundling, especially in the form of reduced 
investment and innovation incentives. With its emphasis on "reasonably 
efficient competitors" and inter-modal competition, the new standard seems 
to improve, but not necessarily clarify the "impairment" threshold. In its latest 
Order, the FCC paid considerable attention to substantiating its rules with 
empirical evidence. At this point in time it is difficult to anticipate whether the 
ILECs, which had fought for even less stringent rules than the ones adopted, 
will continue their court challenges of the unbundling rules or whether they 
might shift to other strategies. 
?  New technologies play more important role  
A second development contributing to the new approach was the 
perception that new technologies were on the verge of commercial 
deployment and would intensify competition in local markets. In the 
narrowband voice markets, wireless services have developed into closer 
substitutes to fixed service; cable television companies have gradually 
expanded their share of the market and, as more systems upgrade to digital 
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cable, further growth is expected in the future 8. In the broadband markets, 
in addition to the players just mentioned, the gradual migration toward 3G 
services and other wireless broadband platforms - e.g., WiFi (802.11), 
WiMax (802.16) or Mobile-Fi (802.20), both licensed and unlicensed, 
satellite-based services, and powerline communications promise additional 
competition. During the past few years, the FCC has adopted policies to 
facilitate the growth of these alternative platforms. For example, it has made 
more electromagnetic spectrum available for licensed advanced mobile 
services and expanded unlicensed bands, not least in support of Wireless 
Internet Service Providers (WISPs), and it has taken action to promote 
powerline communications. Moreover, it seems that the majority of 
Commissioners now envisions VoIP as the future of voice and considers the 
services offered by the new service providers as superior to those supplied 
by many CLECs 9. From that vantage point, narrowband unbundling appears 
less important in the future. However, it might have been justified to retain 
line sharing at least until more robust platform competition has materialized.  
This apparently was the position of the majority of the Commissioners, but in 
a somewhat odd act of political logrolling it was abandoned to facilitate the 
political compromise underlying the Triennial Review Order. Ironically, that 
Order retained a broad range of narrowband unbundling provisions, which 
were later overturned by the appeals court, but eliminated line sharing and 
other broadband unbundling obligations. The FCC apparently did not find a 
way to re-insert line sharing into the latest Order, as had been predicted by 
some experts. 
?  Experiences with narrowband unbundling 
Thirdly, in contrast to earlier decisions, there is now an empirical record 
of outcomes under the previous unbundling rules, which undoubtedly 
influenced the decision. The aim of Congress in the Act was to stimulate 
                     
8 At the end of June 2004, cable provided about 45% of the facilities-based CLEC loops. This 
figure corresponded to about 10% of all CLEC access lines and about 2% of the total number of 
access lines. See Federal Communications Commission, Local Telephone Competition, Status 
as of June 30, 2004, available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Reports/FCC-
State_Link/IAD/lcom1204.pdf. 
9 This is not to say that there is agreement among the FCC Commissioners as to the 
appropriate regulation of VoIP. In fact, they hold widely different views with respect to such 
issues as mandatory emergency calling features, contributions to universal service, and law 
enforcement related to VoIP. 
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facilities-based competition. The implementation of the Act at the federal and 
state levels led to specifications of rules that had several unintended 
consequences. The TELRIC standard for the pricing of unbundled network 
elements resulted in charges based on a hypothetical, efficient greenfield 
technology. The Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs — Bell South, 
Qwest, Verizon, and SBC) claimed that these prices were not cost-covering 
and implied a discount of 50-60% off the retail rate (compared to a 
mandated discount of about 20% for wholesale services sold to resellers).  
In addition to the TELRIC standard, ILECs had to recombine individual 
network elements and sell them at TELRIC prices as platforms (UNE-P).  
This changed the incentives for new market entrants by offering them a 
lower-risk alternative to facilities-based entry.   
The empirical record reveals that UNE-P became the preferred entry 
strategy after the collapse of information and communication technology 
share prices in 2000. Overall, new market entrants were able to expand their 
share in fixed local access lines from about 3.2% in 1997 to 17.8% in 2004, 
a substantial increase (see figure 1). However, the envisioned influx of 
facilities-based competitors was lower than expected. Although the number 
of customers served via CLECs' own facilities increased from 4 to 7.4 
million, UNE-P based lines increased even faster from 4.8 million in 2001 to 
17.1 million in 2004.  
Figure 1 - The growth of local voice competition (million access lines) 
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Figure 2 – Composition of competitive lines (million access lines) 
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Source: FCC Local Competition Reports, various years. 
As a result, the share of CLEC facilities-based lines in total competitive 
lines declined from 31% in 2000 to 23% in 2004. During the same period, re-
sale declined from 45% to 10% and UNE-L from 24% to 13% of all 
competitive lines. However, UNE-P lines increased from very low levels 
(there are no detailed data available for the early years) to 53% (see figure 
2). The investment disincentive argument is not very convincing with respect 
to traditional copper loops, which are already sunk. Moreover, CLECs 
offered innovative services over UNE-P platforms, putting additional 
competitive pressure on the ILECs. The empirical data do not seem to 
support a strong claim that UNE-P was a first step toward facilities-based 
competition in the aggregate, although this is probably true in many specific 
cases. 
?  Experiences with broadband unbundling 
The dynamic incentives of unbundling rules are much more critical in the 
area of broadband communications, where substantial facilities upgrades 
and new investment are required. There is a widespread sentiment among 
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policy-makers and industry that the U.S. is losing ground in broadband vis-à-
vis South Korea, Canada and other leading nations 10. There is a 
remarkable difference in the ranking with regard to cable modem and DSL 
availability: whereas the U.S. ranked number two in terms of households 
passed by cable modem ready systems, it only ranked number eighteen in 
DSL.  BITTLINGMEYER & HAZLETT (2002) have attributed this gap to the 
difference in the legal treatment of cable (free from unbundling obligations) 
and telephone companies.  
At the FCC and in the court rooms, this perception has probably further 
boosted the case against the past unbundling regime. Many contributions in 
this policy debate pointed out that the low UNE prices (often referred to as 
"government mandated discounts") have disadvantaged the ILECs ― and 
especially the RBOCs, due to their stricter regulatory mandates ― and thus 
weakened one major investor in advanced networks. Several studies, some 
financed by the ILECs, argued that UNE-P and TELRIC create a disincentive 
for ILECs to invest in advanced infrastructure (PINDYCK, 2004). Thus, while 
these rules may have advanced the short-run goal of attracting new 
entrants, they may have been in conflict with other goals of the Act, most 
importantly to accelerate broadband deployment. These short and long-term 
effects of unbundling on advanced service deployment are not fully 
investigated.  
The net effect of unbundling rules depends on the outcome of contrary 
forces: the acceleration of market entry and its repercussions on the 
incumbent and the disincentive to invest for the incumbent (and possibly 
new entrants who had otherwise invested more in their own facilities. There 
is also evidence that unbundling has contributed to an acceleration in the 
deployment of advanced technology at the level of wire centers. However, 
even studies that indicate the overall positive effect of unbundling typically 
find that lower prices for UNEs constitute a disincentive for investment 
(GABEL & HUANG, 2003). Whereas these studies added some fuel to the 
discussion on the advantages and disadvantages of the past unbundling 
regime in broadband, they do not necessarily imply the framework laid out in 
the December 2004 Order.  
                     
10 For example, as of June 2004, the OECD (forthcoming) ranked the U.S. number 11 in 
broadband penetration. 
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?  Assessment and outlook 
With the exception of the areas in which impairment continues to exist 
and where the TELRIC pricing guidelines apply, the new rules will probably 
increase prices for inputs sold to competitive carriers in the short run. The 
FCC adopted transition periods to avoid destabilization of the market 
position and business plans of CLECs and to facilitate a migration to other 
solutions. In the areas affected by the most recent Order, price increases 
during the transition are limited to 15% or USD 1.00 as stated. Where they 
are not considered impaired, competitive carriers will have to buy unbundled 
network elements under negotiated agreements or tariffed special access 
prices (or move away from the unbundling model toward resale or facilities-
based competition) after the transition period. Currently, these unregulated 
special access prices typically exceed UNE prices considerably 11. In 
addition, previous changes in the line sharing provisions are likely to 
increase the costs of CLECs and broadband ISPs. A few carriers, for 
example Verizon and Covad, have announced private agreements but it is 
far from certain that smaller competitors will be able to negotiate such 
arrangements. However, it is not straightforward to assume that prices in 
wholesale markets will necessarily increase. BOURREAU & DOĞAN (2005) 
show that under certain conditions, unregulated incumbents may have an 
incentive to price unbundled network elements too low to delay facilities-
based competition 12. Moreover, emerging technologies, such as very 
scaleable switches, may ease potential cost increases in the medium and 
long run. The granular analysis of the FCC did not rely on a detailed analysis 
of the costs for competitors in the market tiers and is thus a rough proxy. It 
remains to be seen whether the remaining unbundled elements will suffice to 
avoid serious cost disadvantages for new competitors in smaller and 
medium-sized markets. 
After the collapse of telecommunication share prices in 2000, many of the 
surviving CLECs are in a weakened financial position and further industry 
consolidation seems likely. The implications of the new rules will also be felt 
by the inter-exchange carriers.  Although this move is not driven solely by 
                     
11 In a study for CompTel/ASCENT, a business association of competitive local exchange 
carriers, BRYANT & PELCOVITS (2004) found that the cost impact of a transition from DS1 
UNEs to special access DS1 would raise the respective costs of CLECs by 100%, and in some 
cases up to 10-fold.  Trade press information often suggests that special access is priced up to 
300-500% above UNEs. 
12 At an anecdotal level, Sprint is pricing its wholesale services very aggressively low. 
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the new unbundling rules, it probably accelerated AT&T's decision to merge 
with SBC Communications, one of the RBOCs. MCI, is also in takeover talks 
with Verizon and Qwest. At this point, competition from wireless and VoIP is 
relatively weak and it remains to be seen whether it will be sufficient to 
discipline pricing by ILECs. On the positive side, even a small competitive 
fringe may be effective in controlling market power in markets with high sunk 
costs. On the negative side, the lower service quality of wireless and VoIP 
services are likely to limit their short-term effect.  Moreover, as broadband is 
only available to 27% of U.S. households and open access provisions to 
broadband platforms are lacking, VoIP service providers remain vulnerable 
to price squeezes and other strategies, such as port blocking by ISPs that 
might tilt the playing field against them.   
All this seems to imply that the most likely scenario is price increases for 
inputs in the short run, which may result in higher retail prices for vulnerable 
customer groups. Further industry consolidation is also likely. In the medium 
and long run, these developments may well stimulate investment and 
competition. They will certainly create stronger incentives for complementary 
facilities investment in the traditional voice markets. There is evidence that 
the ILECs have accelerated their DSL rollout and have initiated large-scale 
projects to bring fiber to the neighborhood (SBC's "Project Lightwave"), the 
curb (Bell South) or the home (Verizon).  If the new framework avoids further 
court challenges, it should reduce the regulatory uncertainty that has 
plagued investors over the past decade and probably depressed investment 
levels. Overall, given the changing industry conditions and the necessity to 
compromise, at the end of the long struggle, the view seems to have 
prevailed that the potential negative effects of higher prices for unbundled 
access, and possibly retail services, pale compared to the benefits from 
stronger investment incentives, the long-term benefits of more robust 
facilities-based competition, and increased regulatory certainty. The Order 
was adopted against the strong protests of Commissioners Copps and 
Adelstein. However, given the past court record and present policy visions, it 
seems unlikely that stronger unbundling provisions will be reestablished in 
the near future. One unknown is the states, which, in principle, could adopt 
laws in favor of continued unbundling, although they would face the threat of 
federal preemption. The U.S. unbundling framework had been very tedious 
and intrusive; the past eight years also illustrate that in an environment with 
increasing competition such detailed regulatory rules are not sustainable.  
The present framework brings the U.S. more into line with the narrowband 
unbundling rules of other nations and introduces a more market-based 
framework for broadband services. 
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